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THE CODDLING OF THE AMERICAN WORKER’S MIND:
THE ANTI-FREE SPEECH NATURE OF POPULAR
LABOR LAW REFORMS
Daniel V. Johns*

INTRODUCTION
In The Coddling of the American Mind, authors Greg Lukianoff and Jonathan
Haidt argue that a culture of intolerance for opposing viewpoints on college campuses
actually serves to hurt the very individuals that the movement seeks to protect.1
Lukianoff and Haidt argue that, among other things, restricting freedom of speech
and suppressing opposing and, arguably, troubling viewpoints actually makes students
more fragile, rather than protected and secure.2 Additionally, the authors posit that
one of the great psychological untruths surrounding such campus debate is that all
of life is merely a battle between the good and evil of differing viewpoints.3 In arguing
against the suppression of speech and opposing viewpoints on college campuses,
Lukianoff and Haidt further assert that students would be better off—and less fragile—
if exposed to contrasting viewpoints on issues of immense concern to both themselves
and society as a whole.4 Or, stated another way, “[d]isputes over ‘the truth’ are resolved by facts, not feelings; by science, not superstition; by debate, not dogma; by
discussion, not denunciation; by heterodoxy, not orthodoxy.”5
The problems inherent in the creation of safe spaces, the suppression of speech,
and the sheltering of students from diverse viewpoints laid out by Lukianoff and
Haidt are not unique to college campuses.6 Over time, the suppression of speech,
* Shareholder, Cozen O’Connor. Author is a resident in the firm’s Philadelphia office and
practices in the Labor and Employment Department. The views expressed in this Article are
solely those of the author.
1
GREG LUKIANOFF & JONATHAN HAIDT, THE CODDLING OF THE AMERICAN MIND: HOW
GOOD INTENTIONS AND BAD IDEAS ARE SETTING UP A GENERATION FOR FAILURE 10 (2018).
2
Id. at 32.
3
Id. at 53–77.
4
Id. at 19–32.
5
William E. Thro, Follow the Truth Wherever It May Lead: The Supreme Court’s Truths
and Myths of Academic Freedom, 45 U. DAYTON L. REV. 261, 262 (2020). For a legal argument
in support of free speech on campuses and elsewhere, see Mark Martin, Introductory Remarks
at Free Speech Symposium, 32 REGENT U. L. REV. 219 (2019). For an argument supportive of
protests to prevent speakers from appearing on college campuses, see Gregory P. Magarian,
When Audiences Object: Free Speech and Campus Speaker Protests, 90 U. COLO. L. REV.
551 (2019).
6
For a discussion of the history and context of recent campus free speech controversies,
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opposing ideas, and perspectives has pervaded an area of the law that, for the most
part, preserves the ability of individuals and organizations to engage in freedom of
expression.7 More specifically, many commentators and a number of recent labor
law reform proposals and initiatives seek to undermine an axiomatic principle of
traditional labor law—absent threat or coercion, all parties have the right to express
their views on unionization during a union representation campaign.8 This principle
is statutorily codified in the Free Speech Proviso of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA or the Act).9 That statutory provision specifically protects “[t]he expressing
of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written,
printed, graphic, or visual form” and further states that such expression “shall not
constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of
[the NLRA], if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of
benefit.”10 The idea behind this proviso is that free expression by either employers,
employees, or unions concerning matters of the workplace cannot be restricted or used
as evidence of illegality if the expression is free from threat or promise of benefit
to employees.11 In addition to allowing the NLRA to pass muster under the First
Amendment, the intent of this provision is obvious: all entities involved in unionization have the right to express their views on the issue without fear of censorship
through unfair labor practice litigation under the NLRA.12
Much like voters in political elections, then, the Free Speech Proviso allows
employees to make their own decisions about unionization after hearing from both
sides of the debate. The importance of employee free choice in union elections has
been long recognized. As the U.S. Supreme Court stated, “[a]ny procedure requiring
see Jason M. Shepard & Kathleen B. Culver, Culture Wars on Campus: Academic Freedom,
the First Amendment, and Partisan Outrage in Polarized Times, 55 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 87,
110–20 (2018).
7
For example, see Alan Story, Employer Speech, Union Representation Elections, and
the First Amendment, 16 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 356 (1995), for a discussion of the development of a free speech doctrine in the workplace and an argument against it. Despite this
constitutional principle, the author ultimately argues that “the First Amendment need not protect employer speech as a direct intervention in the exercise of employees’ federally-protected
electoral rights of self-organization.” Id. at 456.
8
See Labor Law Reform: The Regulation of Free Speech and Equal Access in NLRB
Representation Elections, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 755–62 (1979).
9
29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2000) [hereinafter Free Speech Proviso]. For a discussion of the history of the legal regulation of employer free speech in this area, see Robert F. Koretz, Employer
Free Speech under the Taft-Hartley Act, 6 SYRACUSE L. REV. 82 (1954).
10
Free Speech Proviso, 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2000).
11
See Koretz, supra note 9, at 83.
12
The NLRA designated certain employer and union actions as unfair labor practices,
and thus illegal under the law. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)–(b) (2000). For an interesting discussion
of NLRA unfair labor practices in the context of social media platforms, see Robert Sprague,
Facebook Meets the NLRB: Employee Online Communications and Unfair Labor Practices,
14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 957 (2012).
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a ‘fair’ election must honor the right of those who oppose a union as well as those
who favor it.”13 The NLRA explicitly codifies the right of employees to make this
decision for themselves:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join,
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain
from any or all of such activities . . . .14
Put another way, the law does not and should not dictate the choice of unionization
for employees—rather, it is up to each employee to make that decision for themselves with the majority of votes deciding the issue for each particular workplace.
Despite the statutory protection of free choice and free speech in labor law,
much of the concentration of scholarship and recent proposed labor law reforms
have focused on efforts to interfere with an employer’s ability to speak to employees
about unionization. Underlying much of this scholarship is a fundamental disagreement about the employer’s role in the process for employees to choose or decline
unionization. As one commentator has stated, “[t]he core defect in union election
law . . . is the employer’s status as a party to labor representation proceedings.”15
Perhaps approaching the law from that perspective, many proposed labor law reforms
have sought to limit an employer’s ability to speak to employees during representation
campaigns.16 From proposed prohibitions on employer captive audience meetings,17
to shortening the time period before union elections are held,18 to outright advocacy
for muzzling employer viewpoints completely,19 many labor law reform proposals
trend in the direction of prohibiting free expression by employers during union representation campaigns.
13

NLRB v. Savair Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 270, 278 (1973).
29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000) (emphasis added). For a discussion of the tension between the
NLRB’s remedial powers with respect to employer unfair labor practices and the NLRA’s
bedrock principle of employee freedom of choice, see Diana Dietrich, Labor Law—Remedial
Non-Majority Bargaining Orders—Conair Corp. v. NLRB, 33 U. KAN. L. REV. 345 (1985).
15
Craig Becker, Democracy in the Workplace: Union Representation Elections and
Federal Labor Law, 77 MINN. L. REV. 495, 498 (1993).
16
See id. at 585–94. See also Allie Robbins, Captive Audience Meetings: Employer Speech
vs. Employee Choice, 36 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 591 (2010); Charles J. Morris, Freeing the
Captives: How Captive-Audience Meetings Under the NLRB Can Be Controlled, 69 ADMIN.
L. REV. 869 (2017); Michael M. Oswalt, The Content of Coercion, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1585 (2019).
17
See Becker, supra note 15, at 585–94.
18
See id. at 546.
19
See id. at 585–94.
14
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As the nation enters an era in which a new presidential administration will likely
push such labor law reforms, it is worth considering whether transparently anti-free
speech reform measures make sense for the future of labor policy and law.20 This
Article argues that they do not. Because employee free choice is furthered, not
diminished, by hearing both sides of an issue, American workers should have the
opportunity to hear and evaluate employer speech in the course of union campaigns.
Only then can employees make an informed decision about their workplace future.
In the end, freedom of speech furthers employee freedom of choice—the NLRA’s
statutory goal in union elections. For these reasons, many labor law reform proposals should be rejected and seen for what they are: an attempt to suppress a particular
viewpoint in furtherance of unionization, without regard for employee freedom of
choice or a free and fair debate.
I. THE NLRB’S ELECTION PROCESS AND FREE SPEECH
A. The NLRB Election Process
The process by which employees choose or decline union representation is well
established.21 Generally, a union will collect authorization cards from the group of
employees it seeks to represent.22 If the union collects signed authorization cards
from more than thirty percent of the unit it seeks to represent, it then has the right to
petition the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or the Board) to hold an election
to determine if the employees want to be unionized.23 Absent agreement between the
20

President Biden’s plan on labor issues makes clear his priorities on labor issues, including
incentivizing unionization. See The Biden Plan for Strengthening Worker Organizing, Collective Bargaining, and Unions, JOEBIDEN.COM [hereinafter Biden Plan on Labor], https://joe
biden.com/empowerworkers/#.
21
As noted above, the law explicitly recognizes an employee’s right to “refrain” from
unionization, in addition to his or her right to unionize. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000).
22
See William B. Sullivan, New Developments in Union Authorization Cards and the
NLRB Order to Bargain, 5 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 99, 105 n. 21 (1970). One author has described
a union authorization card as follows:
The union authorization card is basically a piece of paper used by union
organizers and adherents whereby an employee by signing his name
expresses his approval to some form of organizational activity. Authorization cards are generally classified as being either dual purpose or single
purpose. The dual purpose card is one which both authorizes a specific
union as the employee’s bargaining representative and demands an
N.L.R.B. election. The single purpose card on the other hand[] is one
which generally only designates a collective bargaining agent.
Timothy J. Foran, NLRB v. Linden Lumber Co.: Apparent Demise of the Union Authorization
Card, 5 CAP. U. L. REV. 339, 343 (1976); see also Union Authorization Cards, 75 YALE L.J. 805
(1966) (generally discussing the use of authorization cards in the union representation process).
23
NLRB, CASE HANDLING MANUAL, PART II, REPRESENTATION PROCEEDINGS
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parties, the NLRB generally will hold a hearing on the appropriateness of conducting an election.24 Common issues that are litigated at such hearings include the
inclusion or exclusion of particular job classifications or groups of employees from
a separate employer location for voting purposes, as well as supervisory issues.25
After any such issues are decided, the NLRB conducts an election.26 During that
election, employees have the right to cast a secret ballot to make their decision.27 More
specifically, employees generally are provided a paper ballot to cast their vote; when
completed, the ballot is then placed in a box with all of the other employee ballots, and
the ballots are counted without registering or identifying the specific vote made by
any particular employee.28 The question of unionization is determined by majority.29
Between the time of the filing of a petition and the date an election is held,
unions and employers often conduct campaigns to attempt to convince employees
why unionization is, or is not, in their interest.30 Thus, under current law, in a union
representation election, employees have the right to cast their vote without any other
party, union, or employer knowing their position on the issue.31 If more than fifty
percent of the employees cast their ballot in favor of unionization, the union will be
§§ 11002.1(a), 11023.1, https://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/pages/node-174
/chm-part-ii-rep2019published-9-17-20.pdf [https://perma.cc/9QJZ-FJ4N]. Although thirty
percent is the minimum showing of interest to support the filing of a representation petition,
many unions will not file unless they have authorization cards in excess of fifty percent of the
proposed unit of employees.
24
Id. §§ 11180–11248.
25
Id. The test utilized by the NLRB in determining which employees shall be included a
bargaining unit is termed the “community of interest” standard. See, e.g., Tanja L. Thompson
& Brenda N. Canale, Has Specialty Healthcare Changed the Landscape in Organizing and
Representation Proceedings?, 29 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 447, 447–49 (2014) (discussing history of the application of the “community of interest” standard in non-acute health care facilities).
For a discussion of the application of the “community of interest” standard in the higher education context, see Sheldon D. Pollack & Daniel V. Johns, Graduate Students, Unions and
Brown University, 20 LAB. LAW. 243, 248–49 (2004). For a discussion of supervisory issues
under the NLRA, see The NLRB and Supervisory Status: An Explanation of Inconsistent Results,
94 HARV. L. REV. 1713, 1718–26 (1981). For a perspective on determinations of supervisory
status from a recent member of the NLRB, see Philip A. Miscrimarra, The NLRB and Supervisor
Status: A Board Member’s Perspective on the Self-Driving Workplace, 31 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP.
L. 411 (2016).
26
CASE HANDLING MANUAL, PART II, supra note 23, §§ 11300–11350.
27
Id. §§ 11322.1–11322.4.
28
Id. §§ 11340.1–11340.11.
29
Id. § 11340.8. For a discussion of the factors influencing employee turnout in union
elections, see Henry Farber, Union Organizing Decisions in a Deteriorating Environment:
The Composition of Representation Elections and the Decline in Turnout, 68 ILR REV. J.
WORK & POL’Y 1126 (2015).
30
Julius G. Getman et al., NLRB Regulation of Campaign Tactics: The Behavioral Assumptions on Which the Board Regulates, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1465–68 (1975).
31
CASE HANDLING MANUAL, PART II, supra note 23, §§ 11322.4, 11340.4.
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certified as the bargaining representative of the unit.32 The certification triggers a
duty on the employer to bargain in a good faith attempt to reach an initial collective
bargaining agreement with the union.33
B. Free Speech Under the NLRA
The regulation of employer speech during union representation campaigns has
evolved over time.34 In the early days after the NLRA became law, the NLRB
required strict employer neutrality toward the issue of union representation during
campaigns.35 The principles underlying this regulation were twofold: (1) that in the
context of union representation discussion, employer speech constituted de facto
coercion and; (2) the employer, including its managers and supervisors, should have
no interest in their employees’ decisions concerning unionization.36 These principles
ultimately ran into opposition in the Supreme Court. In Thornhill v. Alabama, the Court
held that the First Amendment applied to speech in the context of labor disputes.37
The following year, in 1941, the Supreme Court went a step further and expressly
recognized the right of employers to engage in free speech during union representation campaigns.38 In so holding, the Court attempted to draw a distinction between
protected free expression by employers and speech that restrained or coerced employees in their choices concerning unionization.39 In 1947, Congress codified the
Court’s holdings in amending the NLRA to include the Free Speech Proviso.40 As
noted above, that statutory provision protects free expression, including employer
speech, in the context of organizing campaigns so long as it does not contain “threat
32

Id. § 11470. For a general discussion of the NLRB objection process and common objections to election results, see Bruce D. Desfor, Note, National Labor Relations Act Elections:
Post-Election Objections, 38 TEMP. L.Q. 288 (1965).
33
For a discussion of first contract bargaining between unions and employers and potential
reform to that process, see William B. Gould IV, The Employee Free Choice Act of 2009,
Labor Law Reform, and What Can Be Done About the Broken System of Labor-Management
Relations Law in the United States, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 291, 324–28 (2008).
34
See, e.g., Michael J. Bennett, Excessive Restriction on Employers’ Restrictions During
Union Representation Campaigns, 66 MARQ. L. REV. 785, 786–94 (1983). For an interesting
discussion of racial appeals during union representation campaigns, see Appeals to Race in
Union Representation Campaigns, 1 U. TOL. L. REV. 224 (1969).
35
Bennett, supra note 34, at 786.
36
Id. at 786–87.
37
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 89 (1940) (“The dissemination of information concerning the facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as within that area of free discussion that
is guaranteed by the Constitution.”).
38
NLRB v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469, 477–80 (1941).
39
Id.
40
Bennett, supra note 34, at 788–89 (noting that under the Free Speech Proviso, “an employer’s right to express its views was firmly established and its speech would fall outside of
constitutional protection only if the speech or the employer’s related conduct clearly coerced
employees”).
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of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.”41 In balancing those interests, the NLRB
has inconsistently enforced where it draws the line as to when employer speech is
viewed as coercive and therefore illegal and when employer speech constitutes
acceptable free expression.42
In the initial aftermath of the passage of the Free Speech Proviso, the Board
adopted the so-called “laboratory conditions” standard In re General Shoe for the
purpose of assessing when speech in the context of a union campaign constitutes an
unfair labor practice.43 That standard in essence developed from this statement in
General Shoe: “[i]n election proceedings, it is the Board’s function to provide a
laboratory in which an experiment may be conducted, under conditions as nearly
ideal as possible, to determine the uninhibited desires of the employees.”44 The
decision allowed the Board to regulate some employer speech in the campaign context,
despite the existence of the Free Speech Proviso.45 Practically, and despite the clear
statutory intent to protect freedom of speech in this context, the General Shoe doctrine allows regulation of speech in union election campaigns even if the speech
does not rise to the level of constituting an unfair labor practice under the NLRA.46
Despite what appear to be obvious statutory and constitutional issues with the Board’s
adoption of the “laboratory conditions” standard, that doctrine has not been subject
to exacting scrutiny in the courts.47 Eventually, the Supreme Court accepted the
laboratory conditions standard in NLRB v. Gissel Packing.48 As some commentators
have noted, the laboratory conditions standard has the potential to make speech
illegal solely because it is convincing, rather than coercive.49
41

Free Speech Proviso, 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2000).
Bennett, supra note 34, at 791–808.
43
In re General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948).
44
Id. (emphasis added).
45
For a discussion of the NLRB’s “laboratory conditions” standard, see Shawn J. LarsenBright, Note, Free Speech and the NLRB’s Laboratory Conditions Doctrine, 77 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 204 (2002).
46
Id. at 215–17.
47
Id. at 217–22. See also Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. NLRB, 451 F.2d 873, 877 (2d Cir.
1971) (“We agree with the Third and Ninth Circuits that Section 8(c) does not limit the Board’s
discretion in determining whether an election was conducted under ‘laboratory’ conditions.”).
48
395 U.S. 575, 612 (1969). The “laboratory conditions” doctrine gives the Board the
regulatory power to “substantively regulate union and employer campaign conduct. If the
Board finds . . . that the employees’ preferences for a bargaining representative may have
been tainted, the doctrine enables it to set aside the otherwise valid election and direct a new
one,” regardless of whether said taint was caused by speech or conduct that was statutorily
or constitutionally permissible. Larsen-Bright, supra note 45, at 207. For a discussion of “how
conduct became speech and speech became conduct” in the development of labor law, see
Ken I. Kersch, How Conduct Became Speech and Speech Became Conduct: A Political
Development Case Study in Labor Law and the Freedom of Speech, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
255, 288–95 (2006).
49
Larsen-Bright, supra note 45, at 242–43 (“When applied in pure speech cases, the
[laboratory conditions] doctrine violates constitutional rights.”); see also Peerless Plywood
42
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In sum, although free speech is generally protected in the context of union organizing campaigns and elections, the NLRB still scrutinizes speech in this area and
may overturn the results of an election if it believes that the speech somehow tainted
the atmosphere of the election. The NLRB can make this determination even in the
absence of employer conduct that otherwise constitutes an unfair labor practice. As
discussed below, the thrust of many proposed labor law reforms would further dilute
the protection of free speech under the NLRA and, in some instances, would outlaw
completely employer expression in the context of union representation campaigns.
II. THE ANTI-FREE SPEECH IMPLICATIONS OF LABOR LAW REFORMS
With the laboratory conditions standard in place, and the concomitant potential for
NLRB review of employer speech in union organizing campaigns, it would seem that
the suppression of employer speech would not be an important focus of labor law
reform. However, a cursory review of many of the reforms proposed by labor unions
and commentators supportive of labor interests cut directly in the other direction.50
That is, it is clear that one of the underlying goals of union-side labor law reform is
to suppress all employer speech to employees—not just coercive or illegal speech—
concerning the issue of unionization to effectively limit the debate to one pro-union
viewpoint. Consider the following oft-proposed labor law reforms as examples.
A. Banning Employer Captive Audience Speeches
Employer captive audience speech, which is best characterized as required employee meetings in which the employer speaks to employees on unionization, has
been legal since at least 1948.51 In the aftermath of the passage of the Free Speech
Proviso, the NLRB reversed its position that captive audience meetings were per se
coercive and unlawful.52 In so finding, the Board held that, regardless of whether employee attendance at the meetings was compulsory, the employer’s right to express
its views on unions was protected.53 It stated, “[a]lthough expressive of the [employer’s]
antipathy toward the [u]nion, the conduct herein does not contain any threat of
reprisal or force or promise of benefit and is therefore protected by the guaranty of
the [F]ree [S]peech [Proviso].”54 Although various decisions of the NLRB have
chipped away at the scope of an employers’ right to hold captive audience meetings
Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427, 429 (1953) (banning employer captive audience speeches within
twenty-four hours of election).
50
See, e.g., Story, supra note 7; Becker, supra note 15; Gould, supra note 33.
51
In re Babcock & Wilcox Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 577, 578 (1948).
52
See, e.g., Clark Bros. Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 802, 805, enforced as modified, NLRB v. Clark
Bros. Co., 163 F.2d 373, 376 (2d Cir. 1947) (employees must be free to choose what information they receive).
53
In re Babcock, 77 N.L.R.B. at 578.
54
Id.
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during union campaigns, the basic right to hold such meetings has continued through
the present time.55 Fundamentally, employer captive audience speeches have been
sanctioned as an appropriate exercise of employer free speech in the context of union
representation campaigns.56
Despite the long-standing acceptance of captive audience speeches as protected
by the Free Speech Proviso, labor law reformers continually argue that employer
speech in this context should be suppressed.57 The Protecting the Right to Organize
Act (the PRO Act), which was passed by the U.S. House of Representatives on
February 6, 2020, explicitly bans employer captive audience speeches in the context
of union organizing campaigns.58 The PRO Act bill specifically provides “[t]hat it
shall be an unfair labor practice under the [NLRA] for any employer to require or
coerce an employee to attend or participate in such employer’s campaign activities
unrelated to the employee’s job duties.”59 As the Biden Plan on Labor explicitly
55

For example, as noted above, the NLRB has limited captive audience meetings in the
twenty-four-hour period immediately before employees vote in a union election. Peerless
Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427, 429 (1953) . More recently, the NLRB clarified this doctrine
in the context of an election conducted by mail ballot rather than an in-person manual ballot
vote. In re Guardsmark, L.L.C., 363 N.L.R.B. No. 103 (2016). There, the Board held that, in
a mail ballot election, captive audience meetings are banned beginning twenty-four hours
before the ballots are scheduled to be mailed to employees. Id. at 3.
56
For an early history of employer captive audience speeches and regulation by the NLRB,
see John M. Schobel, The Captive Audience Doctrine: Its History with the Labor Board, 2
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 360 (1953). For a brief discussion of captive audience meetings beyond just
the United States, see The Captive Audience, 29 COMPAR. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 67 (2008).
57
See, e.g., Paul M. Secunda, The Future of NLRB Doctrine on Captive Audience Speeches,
87 IND. L.J. 123 (2012) (analyzing the likelihood and legal arguments that the NLRB might
use to ban captive audience speeches); Paul M. Secunda, The Contemporary “Fist Inside the
Velvet Glove”: Employer Captive Audience Meetings Under the NLRA, 5 FIU L. REV. 385
(2010) [hereinafter Secunda, The Contemporary “Fist Inside the Velvet Glove”] (advancing
argument that captive audience meetings are incompatible with employee freedom of choice);
Charles J. Morris, Freeing the Captives: How Captive-Audience Meetings Under the NLRB
Can Be Controlled, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 869, 882–83 (2017) (proposing a rule-making to ban
captive audience meetings); Allie Robbins, Captive Audience Meetings: Employer Speech vs.
Employee Choice, 36 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 591 (2010) (discussing potential state worker freedom
acts that ban captive audience meetings); Elizabeth J. Masson, “Captive Audience” Meetings
in Union Organizing Campaigns: Free Speech or Unfair Advantage?, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 169
(2004) (arguing for a ban on captive audience meetings); Roger C. Hartley, Freedom Not to
Listen: A Constitutional Analysis of Compulsory Indoctrination Through Workplace Captive
Audience Meetings, 31 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 65 (2010) (same); David J. Doorey, The
Medium and the “Anti-Union” Message: “Forced Listening” and Captive Audience Meetings
in Canadian Labor Law, 29 COMPAR. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 79 (2008) (discussing changes to
captive audience meetings under Canadian law); Paul M. Secunda, Toward the Viability of
State-Based Legislation to Address Workplace Captive Audience Meetings in the United
States, 29 COMPAR. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 209 (2008) (arguing that state legislation to ban captive
audience meetings should not be preempted by federal labor law).
58
Protecting the Right to Organize Act of 2019, H.R. 2474, 116th Cong. (2019–20).
59
Id. § 2(d)(3).
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endorses the PRO Act, it is very likely that future discussions of labor law reform will
place employer free speech in the context of captive audience speeches at risk of legal
elimination.60 At least one Senate summary of the PRO Act is explicit in characterizing
the legislation as an attempt to curtail employer speech: “The bill prohibits employers
from requiring workers to attend meetings designed to persuade them against voting
in favor of a union.”61 So, it is clear that the PRO Act targets more than just coercive
employer speech, and sweeps in employer speech that merely seeks to convince employees to vote against unionization—arguably a frontal assault on employer freedom
of speech in the workplace.62
Although the PRO Act is a relatively recent proposed labor law reform, similar
arguments in favor of banning captive audience meetings as they pertain to union
campaigns have been proposed in the past. As noted above, arguments against captive
audience meetings have varied from the unfairness of the balance of power between
employees and their employers in the workplace to a constitutional right not to listen
to speech.63 Some scholarship even cites the effectiveness of captive audience meetings
in convincing employees to vote against unionization as evidence of why they should
be banned.64 At a base level, it is not hard to conclude that the proposed reforms do
not reflect an interest in employee freedom of choice on these issues, but suppressing
a specific viewpoint to achieve a desired result—unionization.65
In sum, the labor law reform of banning captive audience speeches has a direct
impact on an employer’s ability to speak to its employees about unionization. It also potentially deprives employees of the benefit of hearing those views while they make
their decision on the unionization question. Such a reform clearly reflects an anti-employer viewpoint, which violates the core free speech principle of content-neutrality.66
60

See Biden Plan on Labor, supra note 20.
See S. COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC. LAB. & PENSIONS, 116TH CONG., PROTECTING THE
RIGHT TO ORGANIZE ACT (2019) (summary by Sen. Patty Murray & Chairman Bobby Scott).
It is worth noting that this summary is also explicit in suggesting that the act of persuading
employees—arguably the very purpose of speech in nearly all instances—is why captive
audience meetings should be banned.
62
The distinction between coercion and persuasion in labor law is not unique to the captive
audience context. For a discussion of the issue in the secondary boycott context, see Barbara
J. Anderson, Comment, Secondary Boycotts and the First Amendment, 51 U. CHI. L. REV.
811 (1984).
63
See Doorey, supra note 57; Secunda, The Contemporary “Fist Inside the Velvet Glove,”
supra note 57; Hartley, supra note 57.
64
Masson, supra note 57, at 190 (“Captive audience meetings are pervasive because they
are effective, and because they are legal.”). One article goes so far as to describe employer meetings with employees—assumedly a regular occurrence—as “plain coercion.” Jonathan P.
Hiatt & Craig Becker, Drift and Division on the Clinton NLRB, 16 LAB. LAW. 103, 115 (2000).
65
See, e.g., Robbins, supra note 57, at 594 (“Captive audience meetings and the discrimination and dismissal to which they often lead should be cause for concern, not only for those
who support the formation of workplace unions. . . .”) (emphasis added).
66
See Lackland H. Bloom, The Rise of the Viewpoint-Discrimination Principle, 72 SMU
L. REV. F. 20, 21 (2019) (“As the Court has explained, viewpoint discrimination is a subset
61
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B. Adopting Quickie Election Rules
Although not as obvious as the captive audience prohibition, recent labor law
reforms to shorten the time period between when a union files a petition for an
election and when the NLRB conducts that election, are also designed to limit and
curtail employer speech in the context of union campaigns. More specifically, on
December 15, 2014, the NLRB finalized a rule that sought to shorten the time period
from the time a union representation petition is filed to the time that a vote is held.67
Deemed the “quickie election” or “ambush election” rule, the NLRB’s reform was
quickly recognized as an attempt to limit the time that employers have to speak to
employees about a question of union representation before an election:
[T]he reality of the Rule and other changes to Board policies is
that the union organizing and elections processes have been
tilted heavily in favor of unions. Nearly every timeline for election procedures has been accelerated. This acceleration helps
unions’ organizing drives because it shortens the time that an
employer has to exercise its free speech rights and conduct an
educational campaign.68
Without specifying an exact time period for when elections should be held, the
rule enacts various changes that allow votes to be held more quickly after the petitions
are filed.69 For example, the new rule limits the type of pre-election challenges an
employer can make to a petition and even limits the filing of briefs after a hearing
which might delay the scheduling and conducting of an election.70 Additionally, the
rule limits employers’ ability to postpone and delay pre-election hearings.71 Finally,
the rule removes some of the obstacles that delay elections, such as the rule on how
long unions must have the list of employees in the bargaining unit before a vote is
held.72 Although some of these processes were changed by the NLRB after President
of content discrimination. As a matter of free speech law, content discrimination is very troublesome, generally giving rise to strict scrutiny. Viewpoint discrimination is significantly worse,
often leading to per se invalidation.”).
67
National Labor Relations Board, Representation—Case Procedures, 79 Fed. Reg. 74,308
(Dec. 15, 2014) [hereinafter NLRB].
68
Michael Lotito et al., Recent Developments in Employment Law and Litigation, 51
TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 375, 377–78 (2016).
69
See NLRB, supra note 67. See also Jeffrey M. Hirsch, NLRB Elections: Ambush or
Anticlimax?, 64 EMORY L.J. 1647, 1650 (2015) (“We should see quicker elections, but not
to the degree that they can be characterized as ‘ambush.’”).
70
Hirsch, supra note 69, at 1657–60.
71
Id. at 1658.
72
Id. at 1654–57.
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Trump came to office, President Biden has taken the position that the Board should
go back to the full quickie election rule processes.73
Although it does not do so directly, as noted above, the intent behind a rule that
shortens the time for campaigns before union representation elections clearly aims
to limit the time that employers have to speak to their employees about unionization.74 As one commentator put it, “[the lapse in time between petition and vote] is
considered problematic because employee interest in collective representation can
wane and dissipate simply by the passage of time. The gap in time before the election
takes place also enables employers to reduce support for the union by running antiunion campaigns.”75 As a union may have been conducting a campaign without
employer knowledge for many months before the filing of a representation petition,
limiting the time between the petition and election greatly restricts the employer’s
ability to mount a robust countercampaign to contrast the union’s ongoing efforts.
Put another way, pursuant to the quickie election rules, “many employees are left
with ‘an unrebutted story, a one-sided story, not necessarily an accurate one.’”76 At
some level, the question needs to be asked whether employer speech is bad solely
because it is effective in convincing employees to vote against a union in a representation campaign.77
C. Eliminating Secret Ballot Elections
Yet another potential labor law reform that has often been proposed is the
elimination of the secret ballot election in favor of deciding unionization based
solely on authorization card signing.78 Rather than using union authorization cards
to obtain a secret-ballot election to determine representation, this process instead
involves a union submitting such cards to the NLRB for determination as to whether
73

See Biden Plan on Labor, supra note 20 (stating that the intent of the Biden Administration is to “codify into law the Obama-Biden era’s NLRB rules allowing for shortened
timelines of union election campaigns”).
74
See Lotito et al., supra note 68, at 378.
75
Samuel Estreicher, Improving the Administration of the National Labor Relations Act
Without Statutory Change, 25 A.B.A. J. LAB & EMP. L. 1, 4–5 (2009). It is worth noting that
an erosion of support for the union is presented as a substantive evil based on much of the
scholarship in this area. Id.
76
Amanda McHenry, The NLRB Wields Its Rulemaking Authority: The New Face of
Representation Elections, 62 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 589, 600 (2011) (citation and quotation
omitted).
77
For just such an argument, see Joseph P. Mastrosimone, Limiting Information in the
Information Age: The NLRB’s Misguided Attempt to Squelch Employer Speech, 52 WASHBURN
L.J. 473, 515 (2013).
78
See, e.g., James J. Brudney, Neutrality Agreements and Card Check Recognition:
Prospects for Changing Paradigms, 90 IOWA L. REV. 819, 823 (2005) (arguing for neutrality
agreements and card check recognition to combat “a regulatory regime that allows, if not encourages, employers to exert inordinate pressure on employee choice in the electoral process”).
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a majority of the employees in the proposed unit have indicated a desire to join a
union based on the cards alone.79 If the union has obtained signed authorization
cards from a majority of the unit, then the unit becomes unionized without a secret
ballot election.80 The issues surrounding the elimination of NLRB secret-ballot
elections and the adoption of unionization based solely on the signing of authorization cards have been described as follows:
A significant policy debate has been occurring regarding union
organizing methods in the United States. This debate focuses on
the appropriateness of granting union recognition based on majority support as demonstrated by union authorization card signatures, also known as “card checking.” Critics describe the practice
as anathema to basic democratic principles and accuse unions of
wanting to deal from the bottom of the deck to secure undeserved
representation of employees. Proponents of card check recognition argue that reliance on [the NLRB’s] organizing procedures
fails to protect employees’ rights to organize, and forces unions to
compete against a stacked deck that unfairly favors employers.81
Card check recognition was a primary aim of the Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA),
a failed legislative attempt to reform the NLRA during the Obama Administration.82
EFCA would have eliminated the need for the NLRB to conduct a Board-supervised
secret ballot election for the determination of whether a union will represent a group
of employees.83
Setting aside the many problematic aspects of deciding union representation
based solely on employee card signing—that is, the complete lack of oversight over
the circumstances upon which an employee is asked, or demanded, to sign the card—it
79

See supra note 23 and accompanying text for a description of how authorization cards
are used under the current representation process.
80
Rather than the NLRB conducting an election and employees voting under the “laboratory
conditions” standard described above, with respect to this process, employees may be asked
to make the decision to sign a card with a union organizer in front of them asking for their
support with no oversight from the NLRB. For a discussion of the “laboratory conditions”
standard, see supra notes 43–49 and accompanying text.
81
Rafael Gely & Timothy D. Chandler, Card Check Recognition: New House Rules for
Union Organizing?, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 247, 247 (2008).
82
The Employee Free Choice Act, H.R. 1696, 109th Cong. (2005) [hereinafter EFCA].
For arguments for and against EFCA, see Juliet Martinez Ortega, Why We Should Support
the Employee Free Choice Act, 31 LAB. STUD. J. 23 (2007) and Roy Adams, The Employee
Free Choice Act: A Skeptical View and Alternative, 31 LAB. STUD. J. 1 (2007). For a discussion
of EFCA’s card check recognition processes, see Daniel V. Johns, Playing with Cards: The
Incompatibility of the Employee Free Choice Act and the National Labor Relations Board’s
Current Doctrines and Practices Governing Union Authorization Cards, 60 LAB. L.J. 16 (2009).
83
Johns, supra note 82, at 16–18.
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is clear that this proposed reform is premised on suppression of employer speech.84
As one commentator has argued:
From the perspective of labor unions, card checks have several
advantages. By eliminating much of the campaigning that occurs
between the union’s request for recognition and the scheduled
election, there is less opportunity for the employer to engage in
anti-union campaigning. . . . In short, the card check process
should make it easier for unions to communicate their message
to employees and have the employees make a decision without
undue pressure from the employer.85
Put another way, card check recognition as a labor policy is designed to influence employees to make a decision on unionization after hearing only from the union
concerning the relevant workplace issues, while potentially denying an employer the
same opportunity to make its case.86 Viewed in this light, card check recognition
sacrifices employer freedom of speech in favor of the purported substantive good
of union representation.87
D. Incentivizing Employer Neutrality
Yet another oft-proposed labor law reform involves pressuring employers to stay
neutral in union campaigns.88 Such a proposal is often, but not always, joined with
card check recognition.89 Employer neutrality can be incentivized in various ways.90
84

As Richard Epstein has put it, “[a]s a matter of first principle, it hardly follows that the
statutory limits on employer speech in the current setting should justify the total neutralization
of employer speech in a secret card check campaign.” Richard A. Epstein, The Ominous
Employee Free Choice Act, 32 REGUL. 48, 53 (2009).
85
Gely & Chandler, supra note 81, at 253–54. Or stated another way, card check recognition allows employees to make a decision on representation while only hearing from one
side of the debate.
86
See Epstein, supra note 84, at 52–54.
87
“Predictably, mandated card-check recognition legislation benefits union organizing
efforts.” Rafael Gely & Timothy D. Chandler, Organizing Principles: The Significance of
Card-Check Laws, ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 475, 512 (2011).
88
For a discussion of neutrality agreements and how they work, see George N. Davies,
Neutrality Agreements: Basic Principles of Enforcement and Available Remedies, 16 LAB.
LAW. 215 (2000).
89
Id. at 215 (“Usually, these provisions take the form of controlled access by the union
to the employees to deliver its message, an employer statement that it does not object to its
employees choosing union representation, and a voluntary recognition of the union by the
employer upon a showing of an authorization card majority.”).
90
For example, the Biden Plan on Labor states that President Biden “will ensure federal contracts only go to employers who sign neutrality agreements committing not to run anti-union
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Generally, neutrality agreements allow unions to campaign for employees to sign
union authorization cards without challenge from the employer.91 Neutrality agreements often explicitly prohibit employers from campaigning against the unionization
effort.92 Usually neutrality arrangements require an employer to do the following:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•

•

agree to a “gag order” on communications to employees about the union;
extend preferential hiring rights at unorganized facilities;
meet promptly with the union to discuss such issues as appropriate unit,
supervisory employees, and excluded employees, etc.;
provide the union with an early list of the names and addresses of
employees in the agreed-to unit;
grant the union access to the facilities of the target employer to distribute
union literature and meet with employees;
recognize the union based on an authorization card majority or some
higher percentage (i.e., without an NLRB election);
agree to start contract negotiations for the newly organized unit within
a short, specified time frame, and submit open issues to binding interest
arbitration if no agreement is reached within sixty days;
extend coverage of the neutrality agreement to affiliates of the signatory
company, defined as companies in which the signatory has at least a
fifty percent interest or exercises control; and
agree not to create another entity in the same industry without ensuring
that it adopts the neutrality agreement.93

Neutrality agreements are effective for unions in winning representation. As one
commentator noted, “[t]he diminished levels of employer opposition presumably
relate to unions’ ability to recruit majority support in a shorter time span through
authorization cards than under election arrangements and also to unions’ ability to
reach large numbers of workers before employers can begin to generate pressure
against the organizing effort.”94 The anti-free speech aspect of employer neutrality
agreements is obvious—keep employers neutral (silent) to allow the only voice
employees hear during a unionization campaign to be from the union side. Indeed,
many neutrality agreements go beyond mandating employer silence in the face of
campaigns.” See Biden Plan on Labor, supra note 20. So, employers that are reliant upon federal
contracts for business may face the choice of giving up their voice in union campaigns or giving
up that business.
91
See Davies, supra note 88, at 215–16.
92
Id.
93
Charles I. Cohen, Neutrality Agreements: Will the NLRB Sanction Its Own Obsolescence?,
16 LAB. LAW. 201, 203 (2000).
94
James J. Brudney, Neutrality Agreements and Card Check Recognition: Prospects for
Changing Paradigms, 90 IOWA L. REV. 819, 826 (2005).
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a union representation campaign, but also require the employer to issue a statement
to employees that it does not oppose the union’s representation efforts.95 Whether
compelling silence or a statement of support, neutrality agreements seek to restrict
employers from expressing any views that oppose or are considered in any way as
negative towards a union organizing effort.96
III. PROTECTING FREEDOM OF SPEECH UNDER THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
As noted above, The Coddling of the American Mind makes the case that the
current anti-free speech climate at many universities should be criticized for a multitude of reasons, but perhaps most prominently for two: (1) a misguided attempt to
protect fragile students from ideas that might “harm” them and; (2) a desire to categorize ideas in two stark buckets labeled “good” and “evil”—classifications which
then easily allow the suppression of all speech contained within the “evil” bucket.97
These two justifications can be applied to the anti-free speech labor law reforms set
forth in the previous sections. For example, it might be argued that such proposals
are justified because employees will be harmed by hearing an argument that runs
contrary to unionization. Thus, it follows that, in the face of any employer speech,
fragile employees are unable to think for themselves and make a decision that is in
their best interest. These reforms also may be viewed through the binary lenses of
“good” and “evil” where the employers’ views are placed squarely in the evil bucket
and thus rendered inappropriate for consumption by employees.98 As set forth below
and as argued in The Coddling of the American Mind, neither of these arguments
justifies these reforms.
95

See Davies, supra note 88, at 215 (neutrality agreements may insist upon “an employer
statement that it does not object to its employees choosing union representation”). But see
Andrew Strom, Rethinking the NLRB’s Approach to Union Recognition Agreements, 15
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 50 (1994) (arguing that unions should be able to negotiate
substantive labor contract provisions in connection with neutrality and in advance of any
employees even deciding that they want to be unionized).
96
For a discussion as to whether the NLRB should enforce neutrality agreements, see
Charles I. Cohen et al., Resisting its Own Obsolescence—How the National Relations Board
is Questioning the Existing Law of Neutrality Agreements, 20 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL’Y 521 (2006). For an analysis of whether employer neutrality agreements are legal
under federal labor law, see Robert J. Mollohan Jr., Employer-Union Organizing Assistance
and Neutrality Agreements: Have We Overshot Congress’s Landing and Upset a Fragile
Balance?, 30 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 885 (2014).
97
LUKIANOFF & HAIDT, supra note 1, at 263. In this regard, the authors posit two great
untruths related to arguments against free expression: “What doesn’t kill you makes you
weaker,” and “[l]ife is a battle between good people and evil people.” Id.
98
Even a cursory review of many of the articles arguing for these labor law reforms
reveals that the authors would place unionization squarely into the good bucket.
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A. The Myth of the Fragile Employee
Initially, the idea that employees are incapable of rationally evaluating their
employer’s viewpoint flies in the face of the legislative intent of the Free Speech
Proviso and the cases that have interpreted it. As set forth above, at a base level, the
Free Speech Proviso allows the NLRA to constitutionally pass muster by requiring
evidence of coercion to make employer speech unlawful.99 There is no question that
the First Amendment protects against unlawful government restriction of speech,
and preserves Americans’ ability to express unpopular ideas and minority viewpoints.100 This principle, of course, is not just for the benefit of the speaker. It is just
as important, if not more important, for the listener, who will benefit in their thinking
from hearing a diversity of viewpoints.101 So, at some level, proposing that the law
should be reformed so as to cut off one side of the debate cannot be squared with the
intent of the Free Speech Proviso and First Amendment doctrine. The listener—in
this case, the employee—loses the benefit of viewpoints opposing unionization in
making his or her decision as to whether to be represented by a union. As one
commentator has stated:
Adequate information is the foundation of freedom to choose.
Lacking full information, the employee cannot effectively evaluate the alternatives. Although employees may err in evaluating
their information, they may also err in appraising their need for
organization if the employer is prevented from raising wages and
benefits to the level he plans to maintain.102
Nor is there any evidence that fragile employees need protection from employer
speech. It is worth noting that these reforms cannot be viewed solely as attempts to
protect employees from coercive employer behavior or speech. Such practices are
already illegal under the NLRA.103 Section 8(a)(1) of the Act specifically prohibits
99

See supra notes 3–12 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the regulation of
coercion in the labor law context, see Michael M. Oswalt, The Content of Coercion, 52 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1585 (2019).
100
“It is precisely here, however, that the protections of the [F]irst [A]mendment come
into play, serving as a shield both for those who would express unpopular or unsound views
and for those who, while profoundly disagreeing with those views, would protect the right
to express them.” Herbert T. Schwartz, The Student, the University and the First Amendment,
31 OHIO ST. L.J. 635, 647 (1970).
101
See Skyline Distributors, Inc. v. NLRB, 99 F.3d 403 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see also Charles
C. Jackson & Jeffrey S. Heller, Promises and Grants of Benefits under the National Labor
Relations Act, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 62 (1983) (“[E]mployee free choice is enhanced to the
degree the full economic consequences of the vote for or against the union are disclosed.”).
102
David J. Hamilton, NLRB Proscription on Granting of Benefits During Election
Campaigns—A Detriment to Employees, 1981 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 723, 732 (1981).
103
29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (2000). For a discussion of employer unfair labor practices during
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employers from engaging in any actions that interfere with employees who engage
in protected activity.104 Such protected activity would include, of course, an employee
attempting to organize or supporting a union.105 Thus, it is not necessary to eliminate
employer speech to remove coercion from the union representation process.
Going beyond coercion, in an effort to protect employees from undue influence,
the Supreme Court has even gone so far as to prohibit employers from making any
promises to employees in the context of a union representation campaign.106 In
prohibiting such promises, the Court relies upon a metaphor: “The danger inherent
in well-timed increases in benefits is the suggestion of a fist inside the velvet glove.”107
Perhaps counterintuitively, the law does not prohibit promises by unions during
representation campaigns.108 The reasoning behind this distinction generally has
been expressed as an assertion that employees have the ability to disregard union
promises because they understand that unions cannot guarantee delivery.109 On the
other hand, employer promises are presumed to be pernicious because employers
can deliver on their promises and thus have a greater ability to influence employee
sentiment improperly.110 Put another way, the law assumes that employees have the
ability to distinguish between true and false promises made during representation
campaigns. Viewed in this light, there is very little justification for reforming labor law
to restrict or completely prevent employer speech when employees are able to filter
good information from bad and to make decisions in their self-interest accordingly.111
representation campaigns, see Robert J. LaLonde & Bernard D. Meltzer, Hard Times for
Unions: Another Look at the Significance of Employer Illegalities, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 953,
961–69 (1991).
104
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).
105
Id.
106
NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405 (1964).
107
Id. at 409 (emphasis added). For a criticism of the Court’s metaphoric reasoning in banning
employer promises during campaigns, see Charles C. Jackson & Jeffrey S. Heller, Promises
and Grants of Benefits under the National Labor Relations Act, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1982–83);
see also Skyline Distributors, Inc. v. NLRB, 99 F.3d 403 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (describing the
Exchange Parts reasoning as “counterintuitive”).
108
Daniel V. Johns, Promises, Promises: Rethinking the NLRB’s Distinction Between
Employer and Union Promises During Representation Campaigns, 10 U. PA. J. BUS. & EMP.
L. 433, 437–39 (2008).
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Scholars recognized this point as far back as the 1970s, when a comprehensive study
determined that employees generally were unmoved by information provided by employers
during campaigns. Julius G. Getman & Stephen B. Goldberg, The Behavioral Assumptions
Underlying NLRB Regulation of Campaign Misrepresentations: An Empirical Evaluation
Part II, 28 STAN. L. REV. 263, 283 (1976); see also Kate Bronfenbrenner, The Role of Union
Strategies in NLRB Certification Elections, 50 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 195 (1997) (arguing
that union tactics in representation campaigns play a greater role in determining election results
than employer strategies); Epstein, supra note 84, at 53 (“The general view we have of political
debates is that they work better with more, rather than less, information. I see no social
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Moreover, as this author has argued in another context, employer speech should
be viewed as even more valuable to employees than union speech during representation campaigns.112 Employees generally have more experience with and a longer-term
relationship with the representatives of their employer.113 Contrast that relationship
and knowledge with that of a union organizer who employees are much more likely
to have no relationship with at all, let alone any personal history that would inform
their decision making with respect to unionization.114 Couple that lack of experience
with the fact that many employees in the current workplace have little or no experience with unions given the overall decline of unionization in the American workplace.115 In that context, banning employer speech, which employees are best able
to filter and judge based upon their personal experience, cannot be justified from the
standpoint of employee free choice. Employee freedom of choice in the unionization
decision is furthered by the receipt of more information, not less.116
Employees are not fragile and should not be treated as incapable of hearing,
assessing, and/or, where appropriate, disregarding employer speech. As in all elections, voters benefit from hearing all sides of an issue before making a decision. Any
attempt to reform labor law should reflect this fundamental and axiomatic principle.
B. Union Speech Versus Employer Speech: Good Versus Evil?
If restrictions on employer speech cannot be justified based on the NLRA’s
statutory framework or the fragility of the American worker, then what motivates
the attempts to reform labor law in this way? The Coddling of the American Mind
suggests an answer to this question as well.117 Unfortunately, many labor law reforms
appear to reflect a basic assumption that unionization is a substantive good, regardless of employee choice, and the employer’s views (which are presumably antiunion) therefore belong squarely in the bucket of evil to be treated as a malevolent
attempt to influence employees to act against their self-interest.118 Viewed in that
justification whatsoever for a system that silences both the employer and dissident workers
in order to facilitate union organization drives that could easily result in trapping workers who
have not had the opportunity to express their preferences.”).
112
Johns, supra note 108.
113
Id. at 449–50.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Epstein, supra note 84, at 53.
117
LUKIANOFF & HAIDT, supra note 1.
118
This viewpoint is completely inconsistent with the intent and structure of the NLRA.
“But because labor law neither favors nor disfavors unionization, instead allowing employees
to decide which form of bargaining they prefer, the appropriateness of curtailing managerial
intervention in union organizing efforts must be investigated as part of an overall analysis
of employee choice.” Benjamin I. Sachs, Enabling Employee Choice: A Structural Approach
to the Rules of Union Organizing, 123 HARV. L. REV. 655, 658 (2010) (emphasis added).
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light, these labor law reforms do not reflect a desire to protect employees in making
a free and informed decision for themselves, but instead reflect an attempt to influence
the process so that it is more likely that employees will unionize and thus reject the
evil of their employer’s views.119 Under this thinking, employee choice might be
viewed as irrelevant to the overall substantive good of unions winning as many
elections as possible. Or, alternatively, this viewpoint might be supported by the
thought that employees are not intelligent enough to know that unionization is in
their self-interest so the law has to step in to make employees’ decision for them.120
In my view, these arguments are false.
The world is not so black and white that in all instances employee interests
should be viewed as being served by unionization.121 As the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit has noted, sometimes the campaign process results
in employees getting “exactly what they wanted” without unionization.122 In such an
instance, is it a substantive good to force employees to become unionized even if
they do not believe it is in their self-interest?123 If the employees in Skyline Distributors, Inc. v. NLRB got exactly what they wanted without paying union dues on an
ongoing basis, it is counterintuitive to suggest that they are ignorant or out of touch
with their own interests. Put simply, as implied by the Skyline decision, these reforms
serve the interest of the union and not the employee. Unionization should not be
viewed as a substantive good if it is contrary to the viewpoint of the affected employees. Or, as one commentator has stated:
[W]e should strive to find ways to ensure employees are making
choices that represent what they really want that are consistent
with those traditions. Such a process would not only uphold
119

See, e.g., Helen Norton, Truth and Lies in the Workplace: Employer Speech and the
First Amendment, 101 MINN. L. REV. 31 (2016) (“[E]mployer speech on these topics can also
inflict substantial harm. More specifically, employers’ lies, misrepresentations, or nondisclosures about the terms and conditions of employment can distort and sometimes even coerce
workers’ important life decision.”).
120
For a discussion of what jobs mean to employees in the modern workplace, see Leo
E. Strine, Jr., A Job Is Not a Hobby: The Judicial Revival of Corporate Paternalism and Its
Problematic Implications, 41 J. CORP. L. 71 (2015).
121
The rejection of such dichotomous thinking is the precise reason why The Coddling
of the American Mind includes the famous quote from Alexandr Solzhenitsyn as one of its
epigraphs: “The line dividing good and evil cuts through the heart of every human being.”
LUKIANOFF & HAIDT, supra note 1, at 237.
122
Skyline Distributors, Inc. v. NLRB, 99 F.3d 403, 407–09 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
123
Perhaps one way to justify favoring the union over the employee’s wishes in this context
is the economic free-rider problem—that is, employees get the benefit of unionization (improvements to their terms and conditions of employment) while avoiding the cost (union
dues) of those improvements. Richard A. Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law, 51 U. CHI.
L. REV. 988, 1004 (1984).
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basic American values and constitutional principles but would
ensure that employees are given the information and time needed
to exercise the right protected by the NLRA—the right to choose
whether to be represented by a union.124
Setting up the union representation process in any other way appears to be nothing
more than a political gift for unions.125 It also ignores the fact that employees have
many reasons to consider voting against unionization that are neither irrational nor
illogical.126 Unionization is not a substantive good if employees do not want it. The
world of labor law is not a choice between good and evil—the truth is more nuanced
than that and employees should be given the right to make that decision for themselves with the maximum amount of information to inform that decision.127
CONCLUSION
Many of the popular proposals that have been advanced to reform labor law
have as their express or implied purpose the suppression of employer speech during
union representation campaigns.128 Not only are such proposals inconsistent with the
Free Speech Proviso of the NLRA, but they are based upon a false and arguably
offensive view of employees.129 Employees are not fragile—they have the ability to
listen to and to assess the value of employer speech during union campaigns without
falling hopelessly into a coerced stupor which prevents them from making a reasoned and independent decision as to the appropriateness of unionization for their
own circumstances.130 As the NLRB recently stated, the election process should be
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Mastrosimone, supra note 77, at 515.
Johns, supra note 108, at 457 n.110. Labor law reforms “should be critically examined
to determine whether it, in fact, furthers employee freedom of choice or whether, instead, it
merely constitutes a political gift to unions.” Id.
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See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Labor Unions: Saviors or Scourges?, 41 CAP. U. L. REV.
1 (2013) (discussing downsides of unions).
127
“Because it is the employee’s ultimate decision as to which position to support, the Court
has decided that the employee should make an educated choice after sifting through the free flow
of information.” Stephen F. Befort & Bryan N. Smith, At the Cutting Edge of Labor Law
Preemption: A Critique of Chamber of Commerce v. Lockyer, 20 LAB. LAW. 107, 126 (2004).
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See supra notes 50–96 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 97–127 and accompanying text.
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It is worth again noting that if employees do not possess the ability to hear their
employers’ views on unionization without becoming hopelessly confused or coerced into
voting a certain way, then how is that they are able to hear union speech without the same
result? This asymmetrical view of labor law is often assumed to be the appropriate result by
commentators. See, e.g., Michael J. Hayes, Let Unions Be Unions: Allowing Grants of Benefits
During Representation Campaigns, 5 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 259, 293–95 (2003) (arguing
for allowing union to grant benefits during representation campaigns while denying employers the same right).
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“a tangible expression of the statutory right of employees to select representatives
of their own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining, or to refrain from
doing so.”131 Reforming labor law to cut off one side of the debate over unionization
does not serve that statutory goal. To view labor law reform through the lens of The
Coddling of the American Mind is to understand that many labor law reforms will
not make the lives of American workers better or assist employees in making their
statutorily guaranteed decision as to whether unionization is right for them. American workers do not need to be coddled—they need to hear from both sides of the
debate to make the best decision for themselves about unionization.
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